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I. Case Law Developments 
The one noteworthy development in Utah’s oil and gas jurisprudence this 
year was the case of J.P. Furlong Co. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas and Mining.
1
  In 
Furlong, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed a non-operator lessee’s 
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 1. 2018 UT 22, 424 P.3d 858 (Utah 2018). 
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challenge to a decision by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (“the Board”) 
to impose a joint operating agreement (“JOA”) between the non-operator, 
J.P. Furlong Company (“Furlong”), and the operator of the existing Board-
approved drilling unit, EP Energy E&P Company, L.P. (“EPE”).
2
  All but 
Furlong and two others in the drilling unit voluntarily pooled their interests 
and signed an industry-standard A.A.P.L. Model Form 610 JOA appointing 
EPE as unit operator.
3
 
Furlong owned only a small fraction of the unit interest
4
 but refused to 
agree to the JOA the other unit owners entered.  Instead, Furlong insisted 
on numerous modifications that called for EPE to adopt different operations 
and accounting procedures specific to Furlong’s minority interest.
5
  Furlong 
demanded the following seven revisions to the JOA proposed by EPE: (1) a 
no recording covenant; (2) a requirement that EPE account for and pay 
overriding royalties that burdened Furlong’s interest, in contrast to each 
lessee bearing its own revenue burdens as adopted by other unit owners; (3) 
an expansion of the industry custom “gross negligence or willful 
misconduct” operator liability standard to include any contractual breach of 
the JOA; (4) a condition that EPE deliver a supplemental authorization to 
each owner prior to any large expenditure; (5) an elimination of the 
operator’s right to make a ‘cash call’ for advanced funding of operations; 
(6) an extension of the statute of limitations for certain JOA contract 
claims; and (7) a restriction on EPE’s pricing procedure when utilizing its 
affiliates for JOA operations.
6
 
EPE rejected nearly all of Furlong’s proffers and maintained that it 
would not change the JOA’s standard procedures to accommodate Furlong.  
As negotiations stalled, EPE sought a Board order to force pool Furlong 
and the remaining holdouts, asking the Board to impose the same JOA 
terms on the non-consenters agreed to by the consenting unit owners 
(without adopting any of Furlong’s proposed modifications).  The Board 
found EPE’s application just and reasonable, relying on the common use of 
EPE’s JOA form in that unit and across the industry.
7
  Furlong argued on 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at ¶1, 424 P.3d at 859. 
 3. See id. at ¶ 7, 424 P.3d at 860. 
 4. Id. at ¶ 6, 424 P.3d at 859 (“Furlong has an interest in only 1.04 percent of Tract 6, 
and just 0.12 percent of the drilling unit.”) 
 5. See id. at ¶¶ 13-19, 424 P.3d at 861-62. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at ¶ 20, 424 P.3d at 862. 
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appeal that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence
8
 
and based on a misapplication of Utah law for failing to “balance the 
interests of competing parties.”
9
  The court held the Board’s decision was 
just and reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
10
  The court also 
explained that the Board was not required to conduct an ‘interest-balancing’ 
test in deciding whether to impose the JOA.
11
 
The court first considered Furlong’s claim that the Board’s decision was 
not just and reasonable because it lacked sufficient evidentiary support, 
citing Utah’s standard that “[a] decision is supported by substantial 
evidence if there is a quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.”
12
  This 
threshold does not call for courts to reweigh evidence or determine whether 
the contested decision was correct; instead, the court focuses only on 
whether the decision was reasonable in light of relevant facts and 
circumstances under which it was made.
13
   
The crux of Furlong’s appeal arose from the Board’s failure to explain 
why each of Furlong’s specific changes to the JOA was not incorporated.  
The court acknowledged the Board could have provided more detail to 
support its conclusion; however, “recognizing that the Board could have 
crafted an order that better explained the Board’s reasoning does not 
translate into a basis for concluding that the Board lacked substantial 
evidence for its decision that the JOA it imposed was just and 
reasonable.”
14
  The court went on to distinguish the facts at hand from those 
in McElhaney v. City of Moab,
15
 which held an agency decision was not just 
and reasonable because it did not offer any factual support, leaving the 
court unable to determine what evidence, if any, the agency considered in 
its ruling.
16
  Unlike in McElhaney, the Board explained that adopting EPE’s 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See id. (Under Utah Code § 63G-4-403(4)(g), the court can set aside agency action 
is made upon a factual determination “not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court.”). 
 9. Id. at ¶ 24, 424 P.3d at 862. 
 10. Id. at ¶ 31 424 P.3d at 864. 
 11. Id at ¶ 39, 424 P.3d at 865. 
 12. Id. at ¶ 25, 424 P.3d at 862 (quoting Provo City v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2015 UT 
32, ¶ 8, 345 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2015)). 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. at ¶ 27, 424 P.3d at 863. 
 15. 2017 UT 65, 423 P.3d 1284 (Utah, September 21, 2017). 
 16. See Furlong at ¶¶ 27-28, 424 P.3d at 863 (citing McElhaney at ¶ 41). 
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The court also rejected Furlong’s claim that the Board was required to 
balance the interest of the parties in deciding whether to impose the JOA on 
Furlong.  The applicable statute does not mandate, or even recommend, a 
balancing test.
18
  Yet, Furlong argued that Utah precedent in Harken 
required the Board to conduct an interest-balancing assessment.
19
  In 
Harken, the court ruled that because spacing orders issued by the Board 
must be just and reasonable under the statute, “spacing orders are dependent 
not only on a variety of factual determinations, but also on the need to 
balance the competing interests of affected parties and on the general 
requirement that they be reasonable.”
20
  The court here denied that Harken 
established a new statutory test for agency decision-making.  Rather, 
“Harken stands for the unremarkable proposition that to be just and 
reasonable, in some cases the Board may have to ‘balance the competing 
interests of affected parties.’”
21
 
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
A. Legislative Developments 
The Utah 2018 General Session produced a number of bills affecting the 
oil and gas industry.
22
   
Senate Bill 191, effective March 26, 2018, addresses the hot topic of 
state preemption and local authority to regulate oil and gas development.  
The bill clarifies that the state holds exclusive jurisdiction over oil and gas 
activity throughout Utah.  It adds an express condition that local rules 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See id. ¶ 33, 424 P.3d at 864 (“Although we can sympathize with Furlong’s desire to 
get more explanation from the Board, we cannot conclude that the Board’s decision lacked 
substantial evidentiary support. Nor can we conclude that the Board imposed a JOA that was 
unjust or unreasonable when the record confirmed that it was based upon the industry 
accepted model form and was materially the same agreement that the other non-operators in 
the drilling pool voluntarily agreed to.”). 
 18. See id. ¶ 39, 424 P.3d at 865. 
 19. See id. at ¶37, 424 P.3d at 865 (citing Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas 
and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1996)). 
 20. See id. (quoting Harken, 920 P.2d at 1179). 
 21. Id. at ¶ 39, 424 P.3d at 865 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 22. This section is intended to summarize each bill’s key components and should not be 
considered an exhaustive summary of any particular bill or resolution. 
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“comply with the state’s exclusive jurisdiction,”
23
 providing that a 
municipality or county may not regulate surface activity deemed “incident 
to an oil and gas activity”
24
 unless the municipality demonstrates that the 
new rule 
(i) is necessary for the purposes of this chapter;
25
 (ii) does not 
effectively or unduly limit, ban, or prohibit an oil and gas 
activity; and (iii) does not interfere with the state’s exclusive 




The new Section 40-6-2.5 pronounces oil and gas activity as a matter of 
statewide concern for which the state has exclusive jurisdiction over “the 
whole field of potential regulation.”
27
  This section also defines “oil and gas 
activity” as 
any activity associated with the exploration, development, 
production, processing, and transportation of oil and gas as set 
forth in Title 40, Chapter 6, Board and Division of Oil, Gas and 
Mining, including: (i) drilling; (ii) hydraulic fracture stimulation; 
(iii) completion, maintenance, reworking, recompletion, 
disposal, plugging, and abandonment of wells; (iv) construction 
activities; (v) secondary and tertiary recovery techniques; (vi) 
remediation activities; and (vii) any other activity identified by 
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining.
28
 
House Bill 27, effective May 8, 2018, introduces a few changes to Utah’s 
Underground Storage Tank Act (the “USTA”).  In continuing the USTA for 
another ten years,
29
 this bill increases the maximum amount of the director 
                                                                                                                 
 23. S.B. 191, 2018 Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2018) (amending Utah Code § 10-9a-102 and § 17-
27a-102). 
 24. Id. (amending Utah Code § 10-9a-102). 
 25. The purposes of these chapters, which grant land use authority to local governments, 
include “health, safety and welfare,” and various other purposes as stated in § 10-9a-102(1) 
and § 17-27a-102(1).  
 26. See § 10-9a-102(3)(b); § 17-27a-102(3)(b); § 40-6-2.5. 
 27. S.B. 191, § 40-6-2.5. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See H.B. 27, 2018 Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2018) (amending Utah Code § 63I-1-219 
(extending the Act’s repeal date to July 1, 2028). 
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loans available from the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund,
30
 and 
mandates that any applicant for a director loan to upgrade or replace an 




House Bill 419, effective May 8, 2018, introduces two notable 
efficiencies to Utah’s statutory pooling scheme.  First, it expands the 
Board’s authority to issue retroactive pooling orders if no one objects or if 
the source(s) of objection(s) received “engaged in inequitable conduct 
prejudicing another party’s correlative right.”
32
  Second, this bill reduces 
administrative burdens on operators by establishing that, subject to certain 
exceptions,
33
 the terms of an initial Board order to pool interests in a 
drilling unit (and the terms of any Board-approved unit JOA) will 
automatically apply to subsequent wells drilled in the unit.
34
   
B. Regulatory Updates 
This March, the Utah Department of Air Quality (“DAQ”) overhauled its 
permitting system for many oil and gas well site sources.  The various rule 
changes
35
 aim to streamline a ‘permit by rule’ structure that will replace the 
need to apply for an individual permit for each minor source related to oil 
and gas operations, which accounted for more than half of the DAQ’s 
minor-source permits in recent years.
36
  To maintain appropriate 
measurements to implement this new program, existing sources were 





                                                                                                                 
 30. See id. (increasing loan amounts available under § 19-6-409(8)(a)(i) from $150,000 
to $300,000 for all tanks at any one facility, and § 19-6-409(8)(a)(ii) from $50,000 to 
$100,000 per tank). 
 31. See id. (amending 19-6-409(6)(b)(ii); see also Utah Code § 19-6-410.5 for the 
Environmental Assurance Program). 
 32. H.B. 419, 2018 Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2018) (amending § 46-6-6.5(11)(b)(ii)). 
 33. See id. (enacting § 46-6-6.5(11)(b)(ii)). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 307-401, 307-504-10 (2018). 
 36. See Oil & Gas Source Registration (Air Quality), Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality Division of Air Quality, https://deq.utah.gov/air-quality/oil-gas-
source-registration-air-quality (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 37. See id. 
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